| 翻訳と辞書 |
| Expected utility hypothesis ： ウィキペディア英語版 |
Expected utility hypothesis
In economics, game theory, and decision theory the expected utility hypothesis is a hypothesis concerning people's preferences with regard to choices that have uncertain outcomes (gambles). This hypothesis states that if specific axioms are satisfied, the subjective value associated with an individual's gamble is the statistical expectation of that individual's valuations of the outcomes of that gamble. This hypothesis has proved useful to explain some popular choices that seem to contradict the expected value criterion (which takes into account only the sizes of the payouts and the probabilities of occurrence), such as occur in the contexts of gambling and insurance. Daniel Bernoulli initiated this hypothesis in 1738. Until the mid-twentieth century, the standard term for the expected utility was the moral expectation, contrasted with "mathematical expectation" for the expected value.〔"Moral expectation", under Jeff Miller, (Earliest Known Uses of Some of the Words of Mathematics (M) ), accessed 2011-03-24. The term "utility" was first introduced mathematically in this connection by Jevons in 1871; previously the term "moral value" was used.〕
The von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem provides necessary and sufficient conditions under which the expected utility hypothesis holds. From relatively early on, it was accepted that some of these conditions would be violated by real decision-makers in practice but that the conditions could be interpreted nonetheless as 'axioms' of rational choice. Work by Anand (1993) argues against this normative interpretation and shows that 'rationality' does not require transitivity, independence or completeness. This view is now referred to as the 'modern view' and Anand argues that despite the normative and evidential difficulties the general theory of decision-making based on expected utility is an insightful first order approximation that highlights some important fundamental principles of choice, even if it imposes conceptual and technical limits on analysis which need to be relaxed in real world settings where knowledge is less certain or preferences are more sophisticated.
〔Anand, P. (1993) ''Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk'', Oxford, Oxford University Press. ()〕
==Expected value and choice under risk==
In the presence of risky outcomes, a decision maker could use the expected value criterion as a rule of choice: higher expected value investments are simply the preferred ones. For example, suppose there is a gamble in which the probability of getting a $100 payment is 1 in 80 and the alternative, and far more likely, outcome, is getting nothing. Then the expected value of this gamble is $1.25. Given the choice between this gamble and a guaranteed payment of $1, by this simple expected value theory people would choose the $100-or-nothing gamble. However, under expected utility theory, some people would be risk averse enough to prefer the sure thing, even though it has a lower expected value, while other less risk averse people would still choose the riskier, higher-mean gamble.
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
■ウィキペディアで「Expected utility hypothesis」の詳細全文を読む
スポンサード リンク
| 翻訳と辞書 : 翻訳のためのインターネットリソース |
Copyright(C) kotoba.ne.jp 1997-2016. All Rights Reserved.
|
|